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United States v. Union Electric Co., 934
F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
The United States government
brought this action under the
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) seeking approval of a
consent decree requiring certain
potentially responsible parties (PRPs)
to pay costs associated with the
cleanup of the Missouri Electrical Works
Site (MEW Site) near Cape Girardeau,
Missouri. After denying the motion of
non-settling PRPs to intervene, the
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded,
ordering that non-settling PRPs be
allowed to intervene in the present
action. These non-settling PRPs
(Intervenors) contest the government's
motion to re-enter the consent decree,
claiming that their rights to procedural
and substantive due process under
CERCLA are violated by the consent
decree.
The MEW Site was an
electrical equipment repair and sale shop
primarily in the business of repairing
and scrapping electrical transformers.
Since 1953, more than 16,000
transformers were scrapped at the site.
It was estimated that more than 28,000
gallons of oil were not recycled during
this time. Much of the oil was
contaminated with polychlorinated
biphenyl (PCB) and disposed of at the
MEW Site. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) began
investigations of the MEW Site in the
mid-1980's and found PCB-
contaminated soil, as well as possible
evidence of groundwater
contamination. In 1988, EPA and several
PRPs created the Missouri Electric
Works Steering Committee (MEWSC) in
order to conduct a study on the MEW
Site to determine the amount of
contamination, estimate the cleanup
costs, and allocate those costs among
the responsible parties. During the
study, EPA sent notices to all PRPs
inviting them to participate in the
settlement negotiations involving the
cleanup costs and PRP responsibilities.
MEWSC also notified all PRPs of its
ongoing operations. Upon reaching a
settlement agreement, EPA allowed for
all PRPs to voice any objections to the
agreement. The United States filed a
suit seeking injunctive relief and the
recovery of cleanup costs, and the State
of Missouri filed a similar suit within one
month. The cases were consolidated
into the present action for entry of the
consent decree. The Intervenors,
consisting of several service shop
owners who had either sent transformers
to the MEW Site for repair or sold
transformers to MEW either directly or
through third parties, objected to the
entry of the consent decree.
The Intervenors first argued
that the negotiations leading to the
consent decree violated their right to
procedural due process. The
Intervenors claimed they were denied
access to MEWSC due to the
participation fees, MEWSC was
controlled by PRPs that were only
interested in limiting their own liability,
and EPA refused to negotiate separately
with non-settling PRPs. The Court first
found that the participation fees were
reasonable in that the initial fee was only
$200 and the increased fee of $2,500 was
only for PRPs who had equipment at
the site with a total kilovoltampere
rating of over ninety. The Court further
found that PRPs participating in
MEWSC made sufficient efforts to keep
non-participating PRPs appraised of
developments and invited those PRPs
to participate in the negotiations and
MEWSC activities. Last, the Court
found that there was nothing inherently
unfair about EPA negotiating and
settling with MEWSC. CERCLA allows
for EPA to negotiate with representative
groups and to seek settlement with such
groups. EPA invited the Intervenors to
submit separate settlement offers and
was in constant contact with the
Intervenors regarding developments in
the negotiation process. The Court also
noted that even if all parties do not reach
the same agreement with EPA, that
alone does not indicate a lack of
procedural due process.
The Intervenors next argued
that the consent decree violated their
right to substantive due process. The
Intervenors argued that the decree is
arbitrary and capricious in that it
allocates liability based upon the
amount of oil in the transformers sent
to the MEW Site, as opposed to the
levels of PCB in the oil. The Court found
that the allocation formula approved by
MEWSC was not arbitrary or capricious
because there was a lack of reliable
evidence as to the PCB concentrations
in the oil. While MEW had ample
records regarding the number of
transformers and amount of oil brought
into its site, there were no records as to
the PCB concentrations. In addition, all
transformers at the MEW Site, even
those designed to use only mineral oil,
were most likely contaminated with at
least trace amounts of PCBs.
Next, the Court held that the
Intervenors were given the opportunity
to prove that their transformers could
not have possibly contained PCBs at
the level set by the allocation (less than
2 parts per million). While the
Intervenors claimed that the burden of
proof is thus unfairly shifted to them,
such proof is not inherently unfair in
the context of a settlement agreement
because the Intervenors have all of the
possible evidence of minimal PCBs in
their possession. The Court found that
the goal of two parts per million is
mandated by CERCLA and that
possibility of soil contamination
required such a remedial goal.
The Intervenors also argued
that the decree is arbitrary and
capricious in that the allocation includes
all types of transactions, including
sales and repairs effected by third
parties. The Intervenors contend MEW
records were sufficient to show which
transformers were sent to the MEW Site
for scrap and that only those
transformers should be counted as PCB
contaminators. The government argued
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that MEW records were sufficient to
show the identity of the PRPs, but were
lacking enough reliable information to
be used to determine which transformers
were sent to MEW with PCB
contamination. The Court found that
the same evidentiary problems existed
in regards to the individual transformer
transactions with MEW as existed with
the determination of PCB
concentrations.
Last, the Intervenors claimed
that the settling PRPs paid less than their
fair share under the consent decree. The
Intervenors contended that the
allocation attributes them with liability
even though they are not a party to the
decree. The Court held that the consent
decree was legitimate because the
settling parties were allocated sixty-five
percent of the responsibility for the
contamination and the subsequent
investigation, design, and cleanup
costs. The Court also held that the
Intervenors would not be subject to the
allocation formula and would preserve
their ability to argue in further litigation
that they should not be held liable for
any contamination.
The Court also found that the
consent decree satisfied the element of
reasonableness under CERCLA, in that
the agreement reached by the settling
parties adequately sought to protect the
public interest. Also, the Court noted
that a settlement agreement does not
have to be the perfect agreement to be
reasonable, but rather only has to be
reasonable in light of the objective of
CERCLA to reach settlements before
litigation. Finally, the Court held that
the settlement agreement reached by the
parties was consistent with CERCLA
because the agreement satisfied
CERCLA's main principles, namely that
responsible parties be held accountable,
the environment kept unsullied, and that
any responses be made promptly. The
Court also remarked that entry of the
consent decree would save the
government and the public much time
and money over the costs of litigation.
Because the consent decree was
procedurally fair, substantially fair,
reasonable, and consistent with
CERCLA, the court granted the
government's motion to enter the
consent decree.
- John Ellis
CDMG Realty Co. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
96 F.3d 706 (3rd Cir. 1996)
HMAT Associates, plaintiff
and current owner of property
contaminated by hazardous waste, was
sued by the United States under the
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A.
Sections 101(29), 107(a), for the cost of
cleaning up the property. HMAT had
purchased the land from Defendant
Dowel Associates, and sought
contribution from Dowel under
CERCLA, alleging that Dowel was the
owner at the time "disposal" of the waste
occurred. Plaintiff presented two
arguments: first, that contaminated
materials spread during the time that
Dowel owned the property and that this
spreading constituted "disposal" under
CERCLA; and second, that spreading
of the contaminants was caused by
Dowel's soil investigation,. which
constituted "disposal."
The EPA and the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection
and Energy (NJDEPE) had begun
investigating the property in question
in the late 1970s, and in 1982 it was put
on the National Priorities List of
Hazardous Waste Sites. Dowel
purchased the property in 1981. The
only activity which occurred on the land
during Dowel's ownership was a soil
investigation initiated prior to Dowel's
purchase of the parcel. During the
investigation, an engineering firm drilled
nine holes in the ground measuring
twelve to eighteen feet deep to
determine if the land was suitable for
construction. Dowel learned in 1983
that the land was under investigation
and that it might be liable for the cleanup
of the site.
In 1987 HMAT purchased the
ten-acre parcel of land from Dowel
Associates. HMAT was aware at the
time of sale that the land was part of the
Sharkey's Farm Landfill and that the site
was being investigated by state and
federal environmental authorities. One
year after HMAT's purchase of the
property, the EPA and NJDEPE named
HMAT, as current owner of the land, a
defendant under a CERCLA action
seeking to declare future liability and to
recover costs for cleaning up the site.
HMAT filed a third-party suit against
Dowel for contribution.
The district court ruled in favor
of Dowel on its motion for summary
judgment, rejecting HMAT's argument
that CERCLA confers liability on
passive spreading of contamination, and
concluding that if Dowel's soil
investigation did cause spreading, this
spreading was too minor to constitute
"disposal." The ruling was appealed
and the Third Circuit first addressed
HMAT's claim that passive spreading
in a landfill constitutes "disposal."
Under CERCLA, four classes of people
may be held liable for response costs or
contribution, and HMAT contended
that Dowel fell into the class of "any
person who owned or operated the
facility at the time of disposal." The
court extensively discussed the various
definitions of "disposal" under
CERCLA and under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act. The
court concluded that, even though other
courts have recognized the idea that
passive migration of contaminants does
occur and so it may be assumed that it
has spread during a certain length of
ownership, passive migration does not
constitute disposal under the text and
structure of CERCLA.
The court stated that its
conclusion that "disposal" under
CERCLA does not include passive
spreading of contaminants was
supported by CERCLA's liability
scheme-namely the defense provided
for "innocent owners." The court
reasoned that because CERCLA
provides a defense for owners who
purchase the land "after the disposal of
hazardous waste," the constant
spreading of waste cannot constitute
"disposal" because there would
generally be no point "after disposal."
The court further stated that
its reading of "disposal" is most
consistent with CERCLA's purposes-
to clean up sites and force polluters to
pay the cost. The court said that
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passive migration which occurs
unbeknownst to a previous owner
during his ownership period is not
enough to characterize the prior owner
as a polluter. Therefore, the court
concluded that HMAT's passive theory
of disposal must fail because the
spreading of the waste did not
constitute "disposal."
Next, the court addressed the
issue of whether soil investigation itself
may constitute disposal. Based on the
record of evidence, the court concluded
that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Dowel's drilling
caused the dispersal of waste. Both
Dowel and HMAT presented affidavits
of experts who provided conflicting
analyses of the evidence. HMAT argued
that Dowel's soil investigation caused
spreading of waste and that this action
constitutes disposal. Dowel argued that
its investigation caused no spreading
of waste.
The Third Circuit disagreed
with the conclusion of the district court
that the distribution of contaminants
must reach a certain level in order to be
classified as "disposal," although the
court did entertain the notion that lower
levels of contamination might provide a
ground for allocating less liability to a
defendant. CERCLA's innocent owner
defense encourages prospective buyers
to conduct soil tests for contamination,
so the court reasoned that in order to
establish that "disposal" has occurred
as a result of such testing, a plaintiff
must also prove that the defendant's
investigation was conducted
negligently.
In conclusion, the court held
that under CERCLA, passive migration
of waste in a landfill is not "disposal."
The court further held that soil
investigation which causes spreading
of contaminants may constitute
"disposal", but that a plaintiff must
show not only that the testing caused





Friends of the Earth v. Crown Cent.
Petroleum, 95 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1996)
Friends of the Earth ("FOE")
brought an action on behalf of itself and
its members under the citizen suit
provision of the Clean Water Act
against Crown Central Petroleum
Corporation, d/b/a La Gloria Oil & Gas
Company ("La Gloria"), alleging 344
violations of La Gloria's National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit, which allowed
discharge of storm-water run-off into
Black Fork Creek. FOE alleged that La
Gloria's unlawful permit violations
directly affected the "health, economic,
recreational, aesthetic and
environmental interests of FOE's
members" at a location 18 miles from the
source of the unlawful run-off.
La Gloria operates an oil
refinery in Tyler, Texas and discharges
storm-water run-off into Black Fork
Creek, as allowed by its NPDES permit
issued by the Environmental Protection
Agency. Black Fork Creek eventually
flows into Lake Palestine, located 18
miles and three tributaries from La
Gloria's storm-water run-off. Lake
Palestine is used by FOE members for
fishing and birdwatching.
In April of 1994, FOE filed suit
in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas and
sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
as well as civil penalties and attorneys'
fees. Two months earlier, FOE had sent
La Gloria a notice letter which alleged
the violations. To support the
allegations, FOE furnished affidavits by
three FOE members, only one of whom
was a member at the time the complaint
was filed. FOE filed two more complaints
against La Gloria, which were
consolidated with the suit. The district
court granted summary judgment for La
Gloria and held that FOE lacked standing
to bring suit. The court found that the
one affiant who was a member at the
time of the first complaint suffered no
injury-in-fact, and even if he had, the
injury would not have been traceable to
the permit violation. Additionally, the
court held that FOE itself lacked
standing to sue because it did not prove
it had suffered injury-in-fact. The court
dismissed the second complaint as
duplicative of the first.
FOE's first argument on appeal
was that it had standing as a
representational association with
members who had standing to make
those claims. La Gloria argued that
because FOE's members' injuries were
not "fairly traceable" to La Gloria's
discharges, FOE lacked standing to
pursue the claim. The court found that
because Lake Palestine, where the
injuries were purportedly suffered, was
18 miles and three tributaries away, the
inference that the unlawful run-off
caused the injury was so attenuated as
to pass by Article III's standing
requirements. FOE's members stated
that they assumed that the discharge
wound up in Lake Palestine because the
water ran that way, but the court found
this to be little more than surmise. FOE
also argued that the "fairly traceable"
test was met because of the absence of
evidence showing that La Gloria's
pollutants evaporated, were diluted or
otherwise dissipated. The court found
that the absence of contrary evidence
does not allow FOE to meet the burden
of proof placed upon them. Thus the
court found that FOE lacked standing
as a representational organization. The
court emphasized the narrow scope of
its holding and left open the possibility
that alternative and more credible
sources of evidence such as water
samples or expert testimony could meet
the "fairly traceable" requirement.
Additionally the court ruled that
because FOE's members did not have
standing to sue for La Gloria's discharge
violations, they also lacked standing to
sue for reporting violations.
FOE's second argument was
that it had standing to litigate on its own
behalf, citing cases based on statutory
standing. Because the court found that
FOE's standing was not statutory but
was based on Article III, the court
disposed of FOE's second argument.
The court also upheld the district
court's order dismissing the second
complaint as duplicative of the first,
citing the general rule which states that






United States Y. Winnie,97 F.3d 975 (7th
Cir. 1996)
During a hunting safari in
Africa in 1981, in which Winnie
participated, a cheetah was shot and
killed. The cheetah was imported into
the United States, and its skin and skull
were subsequently mounted and
displayed in the basement of Winnie's
home. In 1992, eleven years later, federal
and state wildlife agents seized the
mounted cheetah from Winnie's home,
claiming that Winnie illegally possessed
it. In 1995, three years after the seizure,
Winnie was charged with "unlawfully
possessing a cheetah traded in
contravention of the Convention in
International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora as
prohibited by the Endangered Species
Act," 16 U.S.C. § 1538(c)(1), a federal
misdemeanor.
In the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin, Winnie admitted he
possessed the cheetah continuously
after 1981. Because all the elements of
the offense were present in 1981 and he
was not charged within the five year
statute of limitations, Winnie claimed the
prosecution could not proceed. The
government argued that the possession
of an illegally imported endangered
species is a continuing offense which
only ends when possession ends. As
Winnie's possession ended in 1992, the
government contended the charge
against Winnie was timely filed. The
court found the government's argument
persuasive. Upon the failure of Winnie's
motion to dismiss, he entered a guilty
plea to the charge.
On appeal to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, Winnie again
asserted the statute of limitations
defense. The court first explained the
purpose of a statute of limitations in
criminal law-to protect persons from
having to defend themselves against
stale charges. Also, the court stated
that the statute of limitations is intended
to assure that law enforcement officials
act promptly to investigate suspects.
The court, citing Toussie v.
United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970), then
discussed the "continuing offense"
doctrine, which in certain limited
circumstances extends the time period
for bringing criminal charges. In
Toussie, the Supreme Court held that a
continuing offense occurs where the
express language of the substantive
criminal statute mandates such a
conclusion, or given the nature of the
crime involved, Congress clearly
intended it to be treated as a continuing
offense.
The court held that Winnie's
defense failed even without
consideration of the continuing offense
doctrine. First, the court stated that the
relevant facts necessary to Winnie's
appeal were not in dispute, as Winnie
admitted he was in possession of the
cheetah continuously from 1981 to 1992.
Second, the court rejected Winnie's
argument that the offense was
"committed" in 1981 as contrary to the
plain language of the statute, which
describes the crime as "to possess"
protected wildlife. The court maintained
that to adopt Winnie's analysis would
direct a finding that the crime defined in
the statute was "to take possession of'
wildlife, as Winnie did in 1981, rather
than "to possess" wildlife, as Winnie
did through 1992. The court asserted
that Congress did not define the crime
in the way Winnie suggested.
Therefore, the court held that the statute
of limitations did not start running until
Winnie's possession of the cheetah
ended, at which time he stopped
violating the law.
Moreover, because the
cheetah was "contraband," like drugs,
the passage of time could never legalize
its possession. If so, the court
reasoned, someone could hide a
cheetah, or other contraband, until the
statutory period had lapsed and then
be free to display or use it without fear
of punishment. As such reasoning was
uncontemplated by Congress when it
prohibited the possession of
endangered species, the court stated
there was no reason to even consider
the continuing offense doctrine. Finally,
since Winnie was violating the law at
the time the cheetah was seized, the
court of appeals affirmed the district
court's denial of Winnie's motion to
dismiss.
- Melissa McAllister
Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434 (9th Cir.
1996)
Plaintiffs, an individual and
nine aluminum manufacturing companies,
sued several state and federal agencies
challenging the validity of regulations
promulgated under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA). Plaintiffs argued that
salmon harvests in the Columbia river and
off the northwest coast in the Pacific
Ocean violated the ESA because the
states failed to obtain ESA Section 10
permits. Further plaintiffs argued that
several federal agencies, including the
Commerce Department and the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
violated the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA) by failing to issue
Environmental Assessments (EA) and
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS)
in conjunction with their issuing of
incidental take statements pursuant to
ESA Section 7. Plaintiff aluminum
companies wanted to reduce the number
of endangered salmon taken incidental
to commercial fishing expeditions in the
hope that more salmon could be taken
through the diversion of water to
hydroelectric power plants which
provide electricity to the plaintiff
manufacturers. The more salmon that can
be taken in the diversion process
increases the quantity of water that can
be diverted and results in lower electricity
prices for the plaintiff manufacturers.
ESA Section 7 allows certain
federal agencies and other statutorily-
designated "applicants" to obtain
incidental take statements which grant
them an exception to ESA's general
prohibition against the killing or taking
of endangered species. Section 7 allows
a federal agency, (here the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)), to
authorize incidental takings through an
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informal consultation process. By
contrast, ESA Section 10 provides for
the issuance of similar permits to any
party, but the application process is far
more rigorous. In this dispute, the
NMFS, working with the Federal Wildlife
Service (FWS), and the North Pacific
Fishery Management Council (NPFMC)
issued an incidental take statement under
Section 7. The NPFMC governs fisheries
in Washington and Oregon. After the
statements were issued, these two States
then amended their regulations to allow
for such takings.
Plaintiffs argued that when
Section 7 statements are issued,
incidental takings are allowed only by
the "applicants," in this case the agencies
mentioned above. Plaintiffs contended
that Washington and Oregon violated
the ESA by amending their regulations
to allow for such takings without
obtaining their own statement. Plaintiffs
argued that because Washington and
Oregon are not statutorily-designated
"applicants," these States should be
required to go through the more difficult
Section 10 process. Defendants
responded that the ESA allowed any
taking consistent with a Section 7
statement, regardless of who the
"applicants" were. Defendants
contended that, because the incidental
take statement could only be put in effect
through state regulations, the States
could legally take the endangered salmon
in a manner consistent with the
statement. The court examined the
wording of Section 7 and determined that
the agency or other "applicant" did not
have to be the one doing the taking.
However, the court declined to hold that
any taking consistent with a Section 7
statement need not also be authorized
by a Section 10 permit. Rather, the court
held that takings which were clearly
contemplated by a Section 7 statement
and consistent with such statement, do
not also need to be authorized by a
Section 10 permit.
NEPA requires that federal
agencies prepare an EIS for "major
federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment."
Federal regulations allow the agency to
first prepare an EA, and if the EA shows
that the proposed action will have no
significant impact on the environment,
the more time-consuming EIS is excused.
Here a biological assessment was
prepared by the agencies involved, but
neither an EA nor an EIS were prepared.
Plaintiffs argued that the defendant
agencies violated NEPA by failing to
prepare these statements. Defendants
responded that they did not authorize
the harvesting of endangered salmon,
they merely prepared the incidental take
statement and it was the States that
actually amended their regulations to
allow for the taking. The issue then was
the amount of federal agency action
required to trigger NEPA and its
accompanying statements. The court
reasoned that the State action would be
illegal without the incidental take
statement, and that because the
statement was issued by the agencies in
question, this constituted major federal
action for NEPA purposes. The agencies
therefore should have prepared an EA
and possibly an EIS.
Some of the salmon fishing
involved in this controversy took place
off the coast of Alaska. These waters
are governed by the NPFMC. The
Magnuson Act requires that the
Secretary of Commerce review all fish
harvesting plans promulgated by the
NPFMC. If the Secretary of Commerce
does not expressly disapprove a
proposed plan, the plan automatically
takes effect after a specified period of
time. In this instance, the Secretary of
Commerce reviewed the salmon
harvesting plans and failed to object,
thus they became law. Plaintiffs argued
that the Commerce Secretary's failure to
disapprove of these plans constituted
major federal action and accordingly
required the preparation of an EA and
perhaps an EIS. The court stated that
inaction, according to federal
regulations, can often constitute a major
federal action for NEPA purposes.
Again, the court agreed with plaintiffs
and held that the Secretary of
Commerce's failure to object required the
preparation of at least an EA.
In conclusion, the court held
that an ESA Section 7 incidental take
statement did not limit the takings
covered therein to takings by the federal
agencies which promulgated the
statement. However, the court ruled that
the actions taken by federal agencies and
the Commerce Secretary in conjunction
with the salmon harvest plan did
constitute major federal action, and
hence an EA or an EIS was required.
- Edward S. Stevens
Mountain States Legal Found., et al.
v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
Two non-profit corporations,
a lumber company and several
municipalities in Idaho and Montana,
challenged the federal government's
decision to limit timber harvesting to a
tract of land that would ultimately
produce a lesser amount of lumber than
several other alternative tracts. Plaintiffs
instituted their action to prevent the
government from effectuating its
decision and based their claims on
various forest management statutes, the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA") and
the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"). Plaintiffs alleged that the
government, in choosing as it did, acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in light of
other more desirable alternatives and
further failed to consider the larger
consequences of its decision which
plaintiffs argue is required by the
aforementioned statutes. The U.S.
District Court for the District of
Columbia dismissed the suit for lack of
standing. The U.S. Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit, however,
addressed the merits of the claim in
addition to the standing issue.
In 1972, due to significant
insect infestation of trees in the Upper
Yaak drainage region of Montana's
Kootenai National Forest ("KNF"), the
Forest Service desired to increase timber
harvesting in the area to allow loggers
to capture the rapidly decreasing value
of affected trees and to prevent the
possibility of wildfires greatly increased
by the presence of dead trees. After
considering the environmental, social
and economic effects of timber
harvesting in the area, the Forest
Supervisor of the KNF chose a tract of
land upon which increased harvesting
would be permitted. The Supervisor
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believed the tract, termed "Alternative
9A," allowed for the greatest amount of
timber harvesting and economic gain
while preserving and respecting other
wildlife and environmental concerns in
other areas.
The plaintiffs attacked the
Forest Supervisor's choice of
Alternative 9A first as an arbitrary
trade-off that favors the welfare of
KNF's wildlife over the welfare of
loggers and other persons who are
supported by the timber harvesting
industry. Second, plaintiffs asserted
that by not choosing the tract of land
with the greatest amount of trees for
harvesting, the Forest Service subjected
the KNF to an unreasonably higher risk
of wildfire.
The Court of Appeals first
examined the issue of standing and
found that the plaintiffs were required
to establish both constitutional and
prudential standing. In order to merit
"constitutional" standing, the plaintiffs
had to show (a) that they suffered an
injury in fact, (b) that said injury was
caused by the conduct complained of,
and (c) that said injury was capable of
redress in a court of law. For each injury
that warranted constitutional standing,
the plaintiffs were also required to show
"prudential" standing. To do this, the
plaintiffs had to prove that the interests
injured by the conduct complained of
fell within the "zone of interests" the
statutes invoked by the plaintiffs were
designed to protect. Furthermore, the
Court stated that it was necessary to
establish the constitutional and
prudential standing of only one of the
plaintiffs in order to reach the merits of
the claim.
The plaintiffs asserted that
two separate injuries warranted
constitutional standing. First, the
plaintiff lumber company asserted that
as a result of a temporary injunction that
halted tree harvesting in the area
pending resolution of the issue at hand,
it was forced to cease its operations and
therefore lost substantial business and
money. The government argued that
the plaintiffs had no legally cognizable
interest in specified levels of timber
harvest, and therefore had no injury in
fact. The Court of Appeals disagreed
finding that the lumber company's
business loss was concrete and actual,
was sufficiently linked to the
government's action and was capable
of redress. Thus, the lumber company's
injury merited constitutional standing.
Second, plaintiffs claimed that
each of them had particular aesthetic and
environmental interests in the KNF, and
that as a result of the government's
decision to limit harvesting to
Alternative 9A, fewer insect-infested
trees would be removed, thereby
increasing the risk of wildfire. Plaintiffs
asserted that this increased risk was a
substantial enough threat to their
interests to warrant constitutional
standing. The government argued that
the increased risk the plaintiffs
complained of was minimal and had an
insignificant effect on their alleged
interest. The Court of Appeals found
for plaintiffs on this point, ruling that
since the potential for fire destruction
in the KNF was significant in the first
instance, the incremental increases,
however small, presented a
particularized, imminent risk that
resulted directly from the government's
decision. Further, it was redressable and
was enough of a threat to warrant
constitutional standing.
Having granted constitutional
standing to the plaintiffs for both of their
alleged injuries, the Court next
determined whether either injury
warranted prudential standing (i.e.,
whether the statutes upon which the
plaintiff based their claims were
intended to encompass their particular
injuries).
In regard to the forest
management statutes, the Court found
that both of the plaintiffs' claimed
injuries warranted prudential standing
because congressional intent made clear
that these statutes were designed to
protect both economic as well as
aesthetic and environmental interests.
Further, in consideration of NEPA, the
Court ruled that aesthetic enjoyment of
the outdoors was plainly within the
Act's grasp and warranted prudential
standing, although monetary interests
clearly were not covered by the Act.
Finally, and most controversially, the
Court of Appeals found that based on
the wording of various protections
afforded by Congress in the ESA, the
plaintiffs' economic interests were
within the reach of the Act. Although
this was a departure from other circuits,
the court reasoned that in looking at the
type of economic injury the plaintiffs
complained of, and in light of the ESA,
it was compelled to grant prudential
standing to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs'
aesthetic interest in the prevention of
the risk of wildfires, however, did not
warrant prudential standing.
After finding that the plaintiffs
did have sufficient standing, the Court
then turned to the merits of the case.
First, under the forest management
statutes, the Court found for the
government holding that there was no
evidence that the Forest Service acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in regard to a
choice it was allowed by law to make.
The Court did acknowledge, however,
the logic behind the plaintiffs' claim that
the risk of wildfire was increased as a
result of the Forest Supervisor's
selection of Alternative 9A,
Secondly, the Court of
Appeals found that there was no
evidence that the Forest Service failed
to comply with the administrative
requirements of NEPA, and further, that
the plaintiffs could not establish the
need for an environmental impact
statement in regard to the potential of
harm to wildlife as a result of the Forest
Supervisor's decision. Finally, in
considering the ESA, the Court found
that the plaintiffs could show no
evidence that the Forest Service ignored
the economic ramifications of its
decision and that any language in the
ESA requiring a particular designation
of the land in question was inapplicable
to this case.
In conclusion, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed the judgment of the district
court, which found that the plaintiffs
could not be successful in their
challenge of the government's decision
to allow increased timber harvesting in
certain areas of Montana's KNF and not
in others. However, the Court of Appeals
granted standing to the plaintiffs, unlike
the district court, and based its
conclusion on the fact that the plaintiffs
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United States v. Trident Seafoods
Corp., 92 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 1996)
The United States sued Trident
for a violation of the Clean Air Act
(CAA). Trident made an offer of
judgment which the government
rejected. The offer of judgment
exceeded the final judgment and Trident
moved for an award of fees and costs in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68. Trident was awarded
costs but denied attorneys' fees.
Trident appealed the denial of
attorneys' fees and the United States
cross-appealed the award of costs, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Trident, a seafood processing
corporation, purchased a cannery in
Anacortes, Washington in May 1988
and renovated the cannery. An
uncertified subcontractor removed more
than five tons of asbestos in August
and September of 1988, but some five
bags were left behind. An inspector for
the Northwest Air Pollution Control
Authority (NWPACA) inspected the
facility and took samples. All the
samples showed asbestos
contamination. Trident notified the
government that it intended to remove
the five bags and did so on October 5,
1988. A subsequent inspection again
revealed asbestos contamination. A
new removal contractor removed
twenty-five bags on October 14, 1988.
Cited by NWPACA, Trident paid a $250
fine for failing to give written notice of
the planned asbestos removal.
In August 1989 the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
requested information regarding the
asbestos removal from Trident and
Trident promptly responded. In April
1992, the United States Department of
Justice (DOJ) notified Trident that, upon
referral from EPA, DOJ intended to file
suit against them charging a violation
of the National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (42
U.S.C. § 7413(b).
Trident entered settlement
negotiations with DOJ in April 1992 and
rejected an offer to settle in excess of
$3,000,000. Suit followed in June of 1992,
alleging one notice violation and four
workplace violations of the asbestos
NESHAP. In May 1993 Trident offered
a settlement of $30,000 and a consent
decree, which was rejected. The
government also rejected a subsequent
offer by Trident of $50,000.
The court granted summary
judgment to the government on the
notice requirement charge. After
Trident rejected a $125,000 demand from
the government, the case went to trial.
A jury exonerated Trident on all four
workplace violations. Finding the notice
violation to be continuous, the district
court penalized Trident $65,000. Trident
then moved for an award of attorneys'
fees and costs under Rule 68, the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA), and the
CAA. The court granted costs under
EAJA. The circuit reversed a $65,000
penalty and remanded the case to the
district court with instructions to impose
a new penalty not in excess of $25,000.
The district court entered final judgment
and imposed a penalty of $25,000, less
the $250 already paid. Trident appealed
the denial of attorneys' fees and the
government cross-appealed the award
of costs.
Trident argued that Rule 68
allows recovery of costs, including
attorneys' fees, when the judgment
obtained is less than the defendant's
rejected offer. The court noted these
are costs incurred subsequent to the
offer and their award is mandatory. The
court examined the CAA to determine if
attorneys' fees were included in ity'
definition of costs. Applying a plain
meaning interpretation to the Rule and
the statute, the court found an award of
attorneys' fees appropriate only if the
action was unreasonable. Trident
argued this reading would result in no
attorneys' fees ever being awarded
unless the CAA already provided for
them. The court stated that the purpose
of Rule 68 was to encourage settlement
and the government would be
encouraged to look more closely at
settlement offers when its actions would
be judged under a reasonableness
standard. The court also rejected
Tridents' contention that attorneys'
fees were awardable under the EAJA,
distinguishing the cases offered and
stating "the EAJA does not define costs
to include attorneys' fees."
The court noted that
determination of a standard of review
for an action under § 7413(b) was one
of first impression. Drawing upon the
standard of review utilized in EAJA, the
court determined the appropriate
standard to be abuse of discretion.
Further, the EAJA doesn't allow
recovery of fees unless the action is
"substantially justified." Under the
EAJA, the district court must make the
determination of "substantial
justification" and any decision should
be accorded due deference.
Having determined abuse of
discretion to be the proper standard of
review, the Ninth Circuit then applied it
to the facts. The court approved the
application of the "substantially
justified" test, and noted that as
NESHAP violations imposed strict
liability on the offender the district court
did not err in its application of the law in
finding the government had a
reasonable basis for its action. The court
also approved the lower court's
interpretation of the evidence and
ultimately found the district court's
denial of an award of attorneys' fees
proper.
The government argued an
award of costs under the EAJA was
improper as that provision was
preempted by § 7413(b) of the CAA.
The government reasoned the CAA
"specifically provided" for costs only if
the action was unreasonable.
Reviewing this question of statutory
construction de novo, the court turned
first to the plain language of the statutes.
Under EAJA, costs are recoverable by
the prevailing party unless specifically
precluded by another statute; under
CAA, the defending party may recover
costs if the action by the government
was unreasonable. Finding the plain
language did not make clear whether the
statutes provided alternative or
mutually exclusive bases for awarding
costs, the court interpreted the language
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of § 7413(b) as not specifically
precluding the recovery of costs. This
did not cause an "irreconcilable
inconsistency" with the language of the
EAJA and the two statutes could thus
be harmonized. The government
countered the EAJA cost recovery
provisions were meant as a gap filler and
the two statutes were not meant to be
read harmoniously. The court answered
that the purpose of EAJA would be
undermined if costs could only be
recovered under CAA if the
governments' action was unreasonable.
Additionally, nothing in the language
of the provisions to dictate differing
applications. Lastly, the legislative
history of EAJA gave no hint of other
interpretations.
The governments' final
argument the CAA provided only a
narrow waiver of sovereign immunity
was turned aside as a rehash of the just-
discounted argument that the CAA's
more limited recovery scheme should
preempt the EAJA scheme. Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district




Massachusetts v. United States Dep't
of Transp., 93 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
The Court of Appeals upheld
the validity of Massachusetts
legislation instituting a bonding
requirement for transporters who pick
up and drop off hazardous wastes within
the state. The court found the
Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act (HMTA) did not preempt the state
legislation.
Congress passed the HMTA
in an effort to develop a national
regulatory scheme for the transportation
of hazardous substances. The Act
established some uniform standards,
but does not exclude all state
participation in the regulation of
hazardous waste being carried within a
state's borders. The HMTA has two
provisions which direct the role the
states may play in promulgating and
enforcing their own hazardous-waste
regulations. First, 49 U.S.C. §5119
prescribes a "working group of State and
local government officials" to help the
Secretary of Transportation devise
uniform forms and procedures which all
states must follow. The regulations the
group promulgates will take effect only
after adoption by a minimum of 26 states.
Second, 49 U.S.C. §5125 preempts any
state or local requirement that makes
simultaneous compliance with HMTA
and the state's regulation impossible.
In addition, this provision provides for
preemption where any regulation, as
applied or enforced, is an obstacle to
accomplishing and carrying out the
HMTA. Section 5125 also lists specific
types of state regulations that are
automatically preempted if they are not
substantially the same as the
corresponding federal requirements.
Absent from the HMTA or
Department of Transportation (DOT)
regulations is the issue of whether or
how a state may require a waste
transporter to post a bond against which
the state may withdraw any fines
incurred by the transporter for
violations of the state's waste transport
rules. Massachusetts and several other
states enacted their own rules. The
Massachusetts regulation requires a
bond of at least $10,000 for transporters
of hazardous wastes who wish to pick
up or drop off waste at a location in
Massachusetts.
In 1991, the National Solid
Wastes Management Association
challenged Massachusetts's bonding
requirement, as well as those of
Maryland and Pennsylvania, arguing
preemption by HMTA. DOT determined
that HMTA preempted all three states'
rules because the rules "created an
obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of... HMTA." The Court of
Appeals determined there was no
preemption.
DOT argued that any state rule
of the sort passed by Massachusetts
poses an obstacle to accomplishing
HMTA's general goal of uniform waste
regulation. DOT further argued that
§5125 called for a broad reading of the
preemption clause such that any state
rules which simply interfered with a goal
of uniform federal hazardous waste
regulation were preempted.
The court held DOT's
determination unreasonable in light of
the text and structure of §§5119 and
5125 as well as the traditional
presumption against federal preemption
of state rules in areas of traditional state
regulation such as picking up and
dropping off of waste within a state. In
regard to §5119, the preemption
provisions of HMTAdo not permit DOT
to override state procedures for the
transportation of hazardous materials
until 26 states approve the
recommendations. To allow a broad
reading of §5125 such that HMTA
preempts a state bonding requirement
for transporters picking up or dropping
off waste in that state before 26 states
approve the recommendations would
serve to render §5119 superfluous. The
court stated that the clear intent of §5125
was to preempt only state rules in
explicitly described categories, or state
rules with which a party cannot comply
if it complies with HMTA, or finally state
rules that otherwise pose an obstacle
to fulfilling explicit provisions, not
general policies, of HMTA.
Following the lead of the
Supreme Court in CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), the
court here did not rule against
preemption until it had at least examined
whether the relevant agency had put
forth a reasonable interpretation that
would have commanded preemption.
The court held that DOT's
interpretation was unreasonable. The
reasoning included the powerful and
well-established presumption against
extending a preemption statute to
matters not clearly addressed in the
statute into areas of traditional state
control. Moreover, the court would not
accept DOT's broad reading of the
statute to accomplish a goal of
"absolute uniformity" where the actual
limited goal of the statute is "greater
uniformity"
The opinion concluded by
stating that the presence of §5119,
which expressly established that federal
standards may not override state
procedural requirements until 26 states
approve the provisions, precludes any
excessive expansion of HMTA. Since
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DOT's interpretation conflicts with the
HMTA provisions and does not preempt
only those state rules essential to the
"accomplishing" of HMTA, DOT's
interpretation of §5125 preempting
Massachusetts bonding requirement is
unreasonable. The Massachusetts
bonding requirement was held to be
valid.
- Scott P. Keifer
United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459
(8th Cir. 1996)
In the early 1960's, the federal
government purchased easements on
farmland tracts belonging to Kerry
Johansen and Michael Johansen (the
Johansens) for the maintenance of
waterfowl production areas. After two
unusually wet years in North Dakota,
the Johansens requested the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
delineate the extent of the wetland
easements. The FWS denied the request
on the basis that any wetlands that
developed during wet years were
subject to the easement. Nevertheless
the Johansens proceeded to drain
portions of their farmland to contain the
surface and subsurface water. The
United States then charged the
Johansens with unauthorized draining
of wetlands in a Waterfowl Production
Area in violation of 16 U.S.C. § 668dd
(1994).
The District Court for North
Dakota prohibited the Johansens from
arguing that the easements covered
only 105 acres on three tracts of land
and that more than that number of
wetland acres remained after draining.
After entering a conditional guilty plea,
the Johansens appealed the order of the
District Court.
Federal law protecting
waterfowl was amended in 1958 to
permit the acquisition of wetland
easements on individual parcels which
were designated "Waterfowl Production
Areas." The acquisition of the wetland
easements was conditioned on the
consent of the governor of the state
where the land was located. From 1961
to 1977, the governors of North Dakota
consented to the acquisition of 1.5
million acres of wetland.
In the mid-1960's, the FWS
purchased three tracts of land from the
Johansens' predecessors using a
standardized wetland conveyance
developed for the program. As was
standard practice prior to 1976, the
conveyance legally described the whole
parcel of land. Along with the recorded
easement conveyance, the FWS
prepared an Easement Summary which
provided information on the tract
description, the tract acreage, the
wetland acreage, and the cost of
wetland per acre. According to the
summaries, the wetland acres
purportedly purchased were thirty-three
acres in both tract 21X and 24X, and
thirty-five acres in tract 30X.
In their defense, the
Johansens argued that the easements
covered only a portion of their property
and not every wetland that might
develop during any given year. In
support of this, the Johansens pointed
to the easement document language
limiting the drainage of potholes to
"now existing or reoccurring due to
natural causes on the above-entitled
land." The Johansens also relied on the
easement summaries which indicated the
specific number of wetland acres on
each tract of land.
In response, the United States
pointed out that the summary figures
were not recorded as part of the
easement document. The government
further argued that the summaries were
not indicative of the parties intent but
were merely used by government
negotiators to gauge the purchase price
of the easements. In addition, the United
States Attorney argued that prior
decisions of the Eighth Circuit had
specifically interpreted the wetland
easements to encompass all wetlands
on the encumbered parcel.
The Court of Appeals noted
that the government interpretation was
not unreasonable given that the legal
description included the entire tract.
The court also noted that the same
interpretation had been given to the
easements by the Eighth Circuit in prior
decisions. However, the court
concluded that its interpretation was
rejected by the Supreme Court in U.S. v.
North Dakota, 460 U.S 300 (1983). One
of North Dakota's objections was that
the total area described by the wetland
easements, exceeded the gubernatorial
limits of 1.5 million acres. The Supreme
Court acknowledged that Congress had
conditioned acquisition upon obtaining
the consent of the governor of the state
where the land was located. The United
States did not disagree with this point,
but argued that it had not exceeded the
maximum wetland acreage. The
government's position was that it had
acquired only 764,522 wetland acres as
provided for in the Easement Summaries.
The Supreme Court accepted the
government's interpretation of the
easement restriction.
Although the Supreme Court
did not explicitly limit the easement to
the Summary Acreage, the Court of
Appeals determined that applying the
easement to all wetlands on the covered
tract would create a host of problems.
Under an expansive interpretation, the
number of wetland acres would
fluctuate with the amount of rainfall.
This situation was inconsistent with the
FWS Annual Summaries and traditional
norms of real property conveyance. In
addition, any ditching of the land would
impact the formation of wetlands and
thus the easement would effectively
apply to the entire parcel of land. This
result was explicitly rejected by the
Supreme Court in North Dakota. The
Court of Appeals also stressed that the
stringent position taken by the
government in the enforcement
prosecution did not comport with the
efforts toward a cooperative and helpful
relationship between North Dakota, its
farmers, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service which was fundamental to the
success of conservation programs.
In regard to the District
Court's exclusion of evidence offered
by the Johansens, the Court of Appeals
held that the United States's wetland
easements acquired title only to the
acreage specified in the Easement
Summaries, and although the mens rea
element of this crime was fulfilled by
proof that the defendant knew the parcel
was subject to a wetland easement, the
government must still prove that the
defendant drained the Summary
Acreage covered by the easement. The
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converse was also true: a defendant
must be permitted to introduce evidence
proving that he did not drain the
Summary Acreage.
- Mitchell Burgess
ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th
Cir. 1996)
The Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN)
filed suit against the State of Louisiana
through Louisiana's governor, Edwin
Edwards, under the Safe Drinking Water
Act (SDWA) to force compliance with
the Lead Contamination Control Act
(LCCA), 42 U.S.C.A. 300j.
Under the LCCA amendments
to the SDWA, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency is
required to publish and distribute a list
which identifies brands and models of
water coolers which have tanks lined with
lead. The list must be distributed to
schools, educational agencies, and day
care centers, so that they might discover
if there is a danger of lead contamination
and to what degree that danger exists.
Contamination, if detected or suspected,
must be remedied. Under LCCA, the
States must disseminate the information,
along with a guidance document and
testing protocol, to the relevant parties.
Additionally, the States must create a
remedial program to remove lead from
affected school drinking water systems.
In 1994, ACORN sent a "Notice
of Intent to File Suit" letter to Governor
Edwards and various agencies, alleging
that the State had failed to disseminate
such information and to create a remedial
program. Once the letter was received,
the Department of Health did distribute
a list of non-lead free water coolers, but
subsequent to filing suit for failure to
create a remedial program, the plaintiffs
concluded that the list in question did
not meet the requirements of Section
300j-24(d).
The plaintiffs' final amended
complaint alleged that the State of
Louisiana violated Section 300j-24(c) of
LCCA by failing to distribute the list of
non-lead free water coolers compiled by
the EPA. Plaintiffs further alleged that
the State violated Section 300j-24(d) by
failing to establish a remedial action
program. Defendants claimed that
ACORN failed to join several
indispensable parties, that ACORN's
claims were barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and that Sections 300j-24(c)
and 300j-24(d) were unconstitutional.
The district court denied
Defendants' motion to certify the
constitutional questions, but granted
Defendants' motion for summary
judgment and dismissed Plaintiffs' claims
as moot. ACORN then asked the court
to award it attorney's fees and expenses
as proscribed by Section 300j-8(d) of
LCCA, which allows the court to award
such fees "whenever the court
determines such an award is appropriate."
The court ordered Defendants to pay
$41,181.25 to ACORN for fees and
expenses.
On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Firth Circuit,
Defendants challenged both Sections
300j-24(c) and 300j-24(d) as violative of
the Tenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The Court
determined that an inquiry into the
constitutionality of Section 300j-24(c)
was unnecessary, but that an inquiry
into 300j-24(d) was warranted, and that
the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, was controlling.
The argument advanced by
ACORN was that the Tenth Amendment
does not come into play when Congress
acts legitimately under its Article I
powers. Defendants, contended that
New York indicated that Congress cannot
impose any requirement on the States
under an exercise of its powers under the
Commerce Clause. The Fifth Circuit
concluded that both parties'
interpretations ofNew York were flawed.
In its analysis, the court
focused on whether the method of
regulation mandated by Section 300j-
24(d) invaded the "province of state
sovereignty protected by the Tenth
Amendment." The court quoted Justice
O'Connor's opinion in New York as
standing for the proposition that the
federal government may not force the
States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program. The court further
reasoned that the states, under LCCA,
were given a choice between following
congressional direction or being forced
to do so-which was, in practical terms,
no choice at all. The court concluded
that since the statute in question did not
actually give a choice to the states, it
was outside of Congress' authority.
Consequently, the court held that the
State of Louisiana did comply with LCCA
by distributing an EPA fact sheet prior
to litigation, and so reversed the district
court's award of attorney's fees. The
Court further held that Congress'
requirements of the states under Section
300j-24(d) violated the Tenth
Amendment.
-Laura Krasser
Northwest Coalition for Alternatives
to Pesticides v. Browner, 941 F. Supp.
197 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
Northwest Coalition for
Alternatives to Pesticides on behalf of
other public interests group (Plaintiffs),
filed a motion for summary judgment
under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) against Carol Browner as
Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) for failing to
give information on the ingredients of
six commercial pesticides.
In order to sell pesticide in the
United States, a manufacturer is
required by the Federal Insecticide
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
to provide to the EPA a complete
statement of its formula, including the
identities of all ingredients.
Active pesticide ingredients
that harm orkill the target plantoranimal
must be identified on the pesticide
product label. Other ingredients that
are not active are considered inert and
only those that the EPA has determined
to be of "toxicological concern" are
required to be identified on the product
labels.
In addition to the EPA's
requirement that pesticide
manufacturers submit CSFs, the
Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know Act (EPCRA) and
OSHA's Hazard Communication
Standards require chemical
manufacturers to produce Material
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Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) listing the
identity of all the ingredients. In limited
situations, manufacturers that
demonstrate supportable trade secret
claims may exclude the identity of the
chemical ingredient and identify a
generic class instead. MSDS's are
available to the public.
On April 8, 1991, plaintiffs sent
a FOIA request to the EPA seeking
copies of the Confidential Statements
of Formula for six commercial pesticides.
The request noted plaintiffs' "particular
interest in the identity of inert
ingredients, as opposed to percentages
of the ingredients." On May 28, 1991,
the EPA issued an "initial denial" of the
request, reciting its finding that the
records "may contain trade secrets, or
commercial or financial information
which is exempt from disclosure."
Plaintiffs appealed the denial
and subsequently obtained from the
EPA partial copies of the Confidential
Statements of Formula for three of the
six pesticides. The EPA, however,
blocked out the identity of all inert
ingredients (except in the case of one
pesticide ingredient of water) invoking
the trade secret/confidential commercial
exemption.
Two years later, the plaintiffs
requested reconsideration under the
EPA's own regulation for review.
Plaintiffs received no response to their
request for reconsideration, and they
initiated this action.
The plaintiffs' suit in the
United States District Court for the
District of Columbia sought under a
motion for summary judgment: (1) a
finding that the FOIA provides that
information identifying the inert
ingredients of the six pesticides is not
trade secret information or confidential
information, and (2) a finding that the
EPA made its decision to withhold the
requested information without properly
applying the criteria established by its
own regulations. Defendants also
sought summary judgments on those
same issues. The district court granted
partial summary judgment to both
parties.
The court found in favor of
plaintiffs on count 1, acknowledging
that the FOIA exempts information that
is "trade secrets or commercial or
financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential."
The court applied this two prong
analysis and found the defendants
failed to meet either trade secret or
confidential commercial information
status for exemption. The court found
disclosing the common name of an inert
ingredient may not reveal exactly which
one of a class of ingredients sharing the
same common name is used in a
particular pesticide. Thus, the court
found the claim of protection under the
"trade secret" was not adequately
supported and denied it. The court also
found the second prong requiring that
the information is confidential
commercial information was not met.
The court found the defendants failed
to show actual competition and a
likelihood of substantial competitive
injury. The court found that the
information at issue was publicly
available through other sources and no
showing of competitive harm could be
made.
On the second count, the court
ruled in favor of the EPA because
settling count I in plaintiffs favor
rendered the claim moot.
- Pang V Ly




instituted an action contesting as
arbitrary and capricious the decision of
the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) to deny crop
subsidy payments for his 1989 crop.
The USDA had denied such subsidies
after the Soil Conservation Service
(SCS) and the Agricultural Stabilization
and Conservation Service (ASCS)
determined that Downer was in violation
of the Swampbuster provisions of the
Food Security Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-
3824(1994).
Downer farmed land in South
Dakota, which included two tracts
containing manmade water holes. In
1988 and 1989, Downer participated in
the Price Support and Production
Adjustment Program, through which he
received government subsidy
payments. Under Swampbuster, one
who plants crops on converted
wetlands in violation of Swampbuster
becomes ineligible for government crop
subsidy payments. Between the 1988
and 1989 growing seasons, Downer
filled in the two manmade water holes,
or dugouts, and the surrounding area
and planted crops over such filled-in and
surrounding areas. While the USDA
conceded that filling in a manmade
dugout was not in itself impermissible,
the SCS determined that the dugouts
had been located in wetlands and that
Downer had filled in over wetland areas
beyond the boundaries of the dugouts.
Downer first appealed through
the SCS the determination that his filling
had violated Swampbuster. The SCS
determined that the areas involved were
converted wetlands. Second, Downer
administratively appealed through the
ASCS. Downer sought reconsideration
of the SCS's determination, or a
determination that his violation was
excused under the good faith exception
to Swampbuster. Again, Downer's
appeal failed.
Downer refunded to the ASCS
the payments he had received in 1989.
He then sought review in the United
States District Court for the District of
South Dakota, claiming that the SCS and
the ASCS findings were wrong, were
arbitrary and capricious, and denied him
due process of law. The district court
granted summary judgment to the
USDA. Downer then appealed.
Downer did not dispute that
he planted crops on the land at issue
but he did allege that the agency
findings were arbitrary and capricious,
raising four points of contention on
appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals: (1) whether the areas in
question were wetlands; (2) whether
such wetlands were converted; (3)
whether the conversion was
commenced before December 23, 1985;
and (4) whether the areas were artificial
rather than natural wetlands. Further,
Downer asserted that he was deprived
of due process because he did not
receive sufficient notice prior to his
activities that conversion of wetland
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could cause him to be denied crop
subsidy payments, and that his
administrative hearing was inadequate.
The court first addressed the
wetland determination question. To
make a wetland determination, three
factors must be considered under
Swampbuster: whether the land (1) has
a predominance of hydric soils; (2) is
saturated by surface or groundwater
sufficient to support a prevalence of
hydrophytic vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions; and (3) under normal
circumstances supports a prevalence of
such vegetation. The court
acknowledged that the administrative
record reflected that the agency had
considered all three factors. Downer,
however, asserted that while the agency
had taken into account all three factors,
its evidence and the methodology the
agency used did not support its
conclusions as to the second and third
factors. The court rejected his
allegation. The agency used standard
methodology of aerial photography and
comparison sites. Moreover, Downer
presented no evidence beyond the
assertion that the agency's
methodology was inadequate.
The court then noted that
nothing indicated that the agency had
considered any factors extraneous to
those Congress intended to be
considered in making a wetlands
determination. Further, the agency's
determination was a result of its
expertise and not of arbitrary and
capricious decision-making.
Second, the court considered
whether the wetlands at issue had been
converted. Under Swampbuster, a
wetland has been converted when it has
been drained, filled, leveled, or in another
way manipulated in order to make the
production of a crop possible if but for
such action production would not
normally be possible and before such
action the land was wetland, and the
land was neither highly erodible land or
cropland. The court stated that the
administrative record showed that
Downer's filling activity extended onto
the surrounding wetland area and had
made possible crop production which
would not normally have been possible.
Downer asserted that he only filled the
dugouts, not the surrounding areas, and
that his filling activity did not
substantially change the wetlands'
characteristics.
The court acknowledged that
there was no dispute as to whether
Downer filled the dugouts, just the
scope and effect of the fill. The agency
and Downer each presented
contradictory expert soil test evidence
as to the scope and effect of the fill.
The court stated than when the
evidence was contradictory in such a
manner, the agency was entitled to rely
on its experts test and observations.
The court rejected Downer's second
contention, finding that the agency's
determination of conversion was
sufficiently supported by the evidence
and was not arbitrary and capricious.
The court next addressed the
agency's determination of the date of
conversion. Loss of crop subsidies is
not suffered by one who produces
crops on converted wetlands if such
conversion commenced before
December 23, 1985. Downer argued that
the digging of the dugouts in the first
place was equivalent to "manipulating"
the wetlands, that such "manipulation"
began before 1985, and that his activities
in 1989 were the continuation of the
ongoing process of "manipulation."
Downer also maintained that in 1983 he
dug a drainage ditch in one of the
wetlands, which constituted an ongoing
wetland conversion. The court
acknowledged that the question of the
date of conversion hinged on what
"commenced" means. According to the
agency, "commenced" means "active
pursuit" such that "efforts toward the
completion of the conversion activity
have continued on a regular
basis...except for delays due to
circumstances beyond the person's
control." The court concluded that the
administrative record adequately
supported the determination that
Downer had not "commenced"
conversion until 1989.
Finally, the court considered
Downer's contention that the areas
involved were artificial rather than
natural wetlands. Persons who convert
artificially created wetlands are
exempted from crop subsidy ineligibility.
Downer argued that the construction of
the dugouts created the wetlands
surrounding such dugouts. The court
noted that Downer had cited nothing to
support his assertion that the wetlands
were artificial. Moreover, Downer
admitted that there was no evidence on
the issue in the record before the
agency. This admission, the court
concluded, defeated Downer's
argument. No facts were established to
show that Downer would fall within the
exemption he sought. On the basis of
the record, the court concluded that the
district court was correct in finding that
Downer violated Swampbuster and was
not entitled to an exemption.
The court then addressed
Downer's procedural due process
claims. First, Downer asserted that he
was deprived of due process because
he did not receive sufficient notice prior
to his activities that conversion of
wetland could cause him to be denied
crop subsidy payments. The court
noted that whether or not it was the
applicant's or the USDA's duty to insure
that the applicant is informed of the
program's restrictions, the record
showed that Downer's argument was
"baseless." Downer was notified of the
possible presence of a wetland area and
that if conversion of such area was
planned, an SCS investigation should
first be requested. Thus, the court
concluded, Downer had sufficient
notice. Second, Downer asserted that
his administrative hearing was
inadequate. The court noted that
Downer was given extensive process
before he was required to refund the
crop subsidy payment. As Downer's
case was reviewed at the local, state,
and national levels, by numerous
agency experts and scientists, the court
held that Downer's claim of an
inadequate hearing was without merit.
Hence, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the agency.
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